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This  paper  describes  the  challenges  faced  during  the  implementation  of  implicit 
inflation targeting in Turkey and evaluates the transition process to full-fledged inflation 
targeting. Using this background, the paper draws lessons for similar countries considering 
inflation  targeting  as  a  monetary  policy  regime.  We  argue  that,  the  strategy  of  starting 
inflation  targeting  with  an  “implicit”  version  and  gradually  converging  to  full-fledged 
targeting can be a viable option when certain set of conditions is not satisfied. We conjecture, 
however, that implementing a “light” version—namely implicit inflation targeting—does not 
necessarily mean that the system would be exempt from all the prerequisites. In the Turkish 
case, for example, institutional independence and political support seem to have been the 
fundamental conditions for initiating the process of inflation targeting. 
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1. Introduction  
The stabilization policy based on a crawling exchange rate peg adopted in 2000 
ended up with the deepest crisis of Turkish history in February 2001. Central Bank 
of Turkey (CBT) had no choice other than letting the Turkish Lira to float. The 
economy was in need of an alternative monetary policy regime. Given the success 
of other countries and also having exhausted all other possible options in the past, 
inflation targeting emerged as a natural candidate. 
CBT was aware of the fact that inflation targeting is not than a mechanic device 
that can be switched overnight. Adopting inflation targeting with premature initial 
conditions could do more harm than good, since it could lead to a credibility loss 
for both the CBT and the inflation-targeting regime itself. The solution was to adopt 
an intermediate regime, namely, “implicit inflation targeting”, until a reasonable set 
of conditions were satisfied.
1  
This paper attempts to provide a brief account of the implicit inflation targeting 
regime implemented in Turkey between 2002 and 2005. The next couple of sections 
describes  the  challenges  faced  during  the  implementation  and  evaluates  the 
transition  process  to  full-fledged  inflation  targeting.  Using  this  background,  the 
final section draws lessons for similar countries considering inflation targeting as a 
monetary policy regime. 
2. Conditions at the Time of Adoption of Implicit Inflation Targeting 
Turkey failed to fulfill most of the stringent set of “preconditions” at the outset 
of implicit inflation targeting. Following the collapse of the crawling peg, Turkish 
Lira depreciated massively and the annual inflation rate soared to 68 percent at the 
end of 2001. Not only the contemporary inflation but also the past experiences of 
high  and  sticky  inflation  posed  serious  challenges  for  managing  inflation 




                                                 
1 Implicit inflation targeting can be defined as a period under which inflation targets are announced to the 
public, but not the regime and its details as such. It involves country acting as if inflation targeting were 
in place without a formal adoption of the regime. Typically, the central bank would also have other 
intermediate targets, as Turkey did between 2002-2005 in the form of monetary targets.  
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Figure 1. Initial Conditions: Inflation 








Source: Turkish Statistics Institute 
Having been exposed to monetary and/or exchange rate targeting regimes for 
many decades, institutional infrastructure regarding inflation targeting needed to be 
adjusted accordingly. Moreover, inflation dynamics and the monetary transmission 
mechanism  were  highly  uncertain  due  to  the  changing  economic  structure.  Not 
surprisingly, forecasting inflation and implementing monetary policy under these 
conditions was a real challenge—as it is the case in all countries facing massive 
structural transformation.  
What is more, the restructuring of the banking system in 2001 had increased the 
public  debt  burden  to  historically  high  levels  (Figure  2),  making  the  fiscal 
dominance  a  serious  obstacle  to  inflation  targeting.  The  average  maturity  of 
domestic  borrowing  in  2002—the  first  year  of  implicit  inflation  targeting—was 
around 9 months. More than half of the total government debt stock was either in 
some indexed form or denominated in foreign currency, rendering debt dynamics to 
be  highly  sensitive  to  external  shocks.  Accordingly,  debt  sustainability  and 
refinancing issues were at the core of the economic agenda, leaving less room for 
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At the start of implicit inflation targeting, CBT had no problem in controlling 
short-term  interest  rates  through  money  market  operations.  However,  monetary 
policy lacked control over the longer end of the yield curve, because under high 
public debt and short maturities, the risk premium (measured by the EMBI spread) 
in  the  post-crisis  period  exhibited  excess  sensitivity  to  economic  and  political 
“news”  (Figure  3).
2  The  volatile  risk  premium  also  manifested  itself  as  excess 
variability in the exchange rates. Increased volatility in exchange rates coupled with 
fast  and  high  exchange  rate  pass-through—inherited  from  the  exchange  rate 
targeting  regimes—made  forecasting  inflation  even  more  difficult,  limiting  the 
forecast horizon to a mere couple of months.  









Source: JP Morgan. 
                                                 
2 See Akta  et al. (2005) for more on the behavior of risk premium in Turkey. Emir et al. (2005) find that 
news related to the fulfillment of the conditions of the IMF program and of those pertaining to the EU 
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Initial  conditions  were  not  encouraging  on  the  dollarization  side  either.  The 
upper panel of Figure 4 replicates the composite dollarization index developed by 
Reinhart et al. (2003).
3 According to this particular measure, Turkey is a highly 
dollarized economy. The figure shows that dollarization had reached a peak during 
2001  crisis  just  before  the  adoption  of  implicit  inflation  targeting  regime.  The 
bottom  panel  exhibits  that  asset  dollarization  was  also  high  in  the  first  year  of 
implicit inflation targeting. In 2002, about 40% of the total assets were denominated 
in foreign currency.
4  
All  these  indicators  suggest  that  Turkey  failed  to  fulfill  most  of  the  “pre-
conditions” at the start of the implicit inflation targeting regime. However, there 
was  one  critical  condition  that  Turkey  ranked  fairly  high:  central  bank 
independence. The Central Bank Law (CBT Law), which was amended in April 
2001—right after the crisis and before the implementation of the implicit inflation-
targeting regime—strengthened instrument independence by allowing the Bank to 
be fully authorized to choose its monetary policy instrument. The primary objective 
of the CBT was defined as “to achieve and maintain price stability”. The CBT Law 
also opened the door for accountability by requiring bank officials to inform the 
public on the operations of the Bank and the monetary policy. Moreover, the Law 
made necessary that the CBT informs the public should the targets not met in due 
time. Last but not least, CBT could no longer grant advances or extend credit to the 
Treasury and to public establishments and institutions, and could not purchase debt 
instruments issued by the Treasury and public establishments and institutions in the 
primary bond market. 
In  sum,  Turkey  scored  low  in  all  the  initial  conditions  except  “institutional 
independence”. Independence, on the other hand, was a de jure concept yet to be 
tested. Under these circumstances, CBT decided that it would be wise not to adopt 
full-fledged  inflation  targeting,  and  that  monetary  policy  should  converge  to 
inflation targeting gradually. 
 
                                                 
3 The index is computed by using indicators such as the ratio of FX deposits to broad money supply 
(M2Y), the ratio of total external debt stock to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the share of the 
Treasury’s FX-denominated and/or FX-indexed domestic debt in the total domestic debt. The index is 
formed by the addition of these ratios, after they have been normalized to a value of 10. Later on, the 
dollarization levels of countries are classified according to the index values, as low (0-3), medium (4-8), 
high (9-13) and very high (14-30). 
4 See Akıncı et al. (2006) for details of the methodology.  
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Figure 4. Dollarization Indices 











v*:  Foreign Exchange Assets of Non-Banking Sector / Total Assets of Non Banking Sector  
v1*: based on current US Dollar/New Turkish Lira and US Dollar/Euro exchange rates; 
v2*: based on current US Dollar/New Turkish Lira and constant US Dollar/Euro exchange rates. 
3. Challenges Faced in the Introduction and Initial Implementation  
The  sudden  and  unplanned  adoption  of  implicit  inflation  targeting  after  the 
collapse of the exchange rate-based stabilization program did not leave much room 
for preparations. Moreover, the uncertain transmission mechanism and the highly 
volatile  risk  premium  limited  the  monetary  authority’s  ability  to  forecast  and 
control  inflation  at  the  time  of adoption. Econometrics provided no clue on the 
prevalent economic relationships. For example, empirical findings suggested that 
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impact  of  exchange  rate  movements  on  inflation  was  almost  immediate, 
depreciations  were  associated  with  a  decline  in  output,  and  the  impact  of 
movements in the output gap on inflation was negligible. These “stylized facts”, 
which were basically obtained using the time span of fixed exchange rate period, 
had almost no predictive power during the implicit inflation targeting regime under 
a floating exchange rate.
5 
Another important challenge in the implicit inflation targeting period was the 
uncertainty imposed by data-related issues and public’s inexperience with the new 
regime. Although CBT had been exerting vigorous efforts for filling the gap, data 
was  scarce  in  many  areas  and  time  was  needed  to  accumulate  a  history  of 
observations. For example, CBT initiated regular inflation expectation surveys at 
the beginning of the implicit inflation targeting period, yet it took more than a year 
for the market to understand that the survey results reflected overall expectations, 
rather than the CBT’s own forecasts. Change in the methodology and the content of 
consumer price index (CPI) basket in 2004 was an additional challenge. The new 
baskets further increased the uncertainty around the forecasts as the behavior of 
inflation has changed considerably since the new basket was introduced (Figure 5). 
What  is  more,  identifying  temporary  factors  from  permanent  ones—one  of  the 
fundamental principles of inflation targeting—became a real challenge since it was 
not possible to conduct seasonal adjustment.  








Source: Turkish Statistics Institute 
                                                 
5 See Sarıkaya et al.(2005) for some evidence on the time varying nature of macroeconomic relationships 
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In  this  highly  uncertain  environment,  CBT  was  not  able  to  communicate  a 
conventional transmission mechanism during the implicit inflation targeting period. 
Nor  it  was  possible  to  publish  forecasts.  Under  these  circumstances,  building 
credibility was a challenging task. The end-year inflation expectation (based on the 
CBT expectations survey) at the beginning of 2002 was close to 50 percent whereas 
the target was 35 percent (Figure 6). 
Under  the  standard  monetary  transmission  mechanism  and  normal conditions, 
the monetary authority is supposed to raise interest rates when expectations are far 
above the target. However, the CBT never raised interest rates during the implicit 
inflation targeting period of 2002-2005. Instead, CBT pushed for fiscal reforms and 
directed  all  its  communication  efforts  to  convince  the  public  that  economic 
fundamentals were getting sounder under the new stabilization program. Blanchard, 
2004, using a formal model, demonstrated that this approach is likely to have been 
the correct one. Specifically, he showed that raising interest rates against inflation 
pressures  can  “backfire”  when  the  fiscal  sustainability  is  at  risk:  A  rise  in  the 
interest rate, by increasing the default premium, may trigger capital outflows and 
further exacerbate inflationary pressures due to exchange rate pass-through. 
Given the potential problems related to this mechanism, and the premature status 
of the other initial conditions stated above, the CBT appended the phrase “implicit” 
on  the  term  “inflation  targeting”.  By  doing  so,  the  CBT  also  implicitly 
acknowledged that the conventional control mechanism of using short-term interest 
rates  as  a  “leaning  against  the  wind”  policy  tool  might  lead  to  undesirable 
consequences under fiscal dominance.
6 
4. Transition to Inflation Targeting   
Although the CBT and the Government announced a multiyear “projection” of 
inflation consistent with the IMF stand-by program, official inflation and monetary 
targets  were  announced  only  one  year  in  advance  during  the  implicit  inflation 
targeting  period  between  2002-2005.  Monetary  aggregates  were  used  as 
“complementary  anchors”,  implemented  by  restrictions  on  certain  central  bank 
balance sheet items under the IMF stand-by agreement. Should an inconsistency 
arise between the monetary targets and inflation, the former would be revised. This 
mechanism eased the potential conflicts that may arise due to the co-presence of 
                                                 
6 Özatay (2005) gives an example of such an undesirable consequence as follows: “In the post-crisis 
period, the CBT raised its overnight rate just once - in July 2001-and the reactions of the markets were 
adverse. The interest rates in all maturities moved upwards and the Turkish lira depreciated.”  
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monetary  targets  during  the  implementation  of  the  implicit  inflation  targeting 
framework.  
Monetary  policy in the first three years of implicit inflation targeting (period 
between 2002 and 2004) can be characterized as a highly discretionary and opaque 
decision-making process: Timing of the policy decisions was not predictable, and 
the  CBT  provided  no  systematic  information  on  the  future  course  of  monetary 
policy.  Although  the  CBT  Law  defined  the  Monetary  Policy  Committee  as  the 
ultimate body on designing the “strategy” of monetary policy, its role was not clear 
in practice. 
The  CBT  envisioned  implicit  inflation  targeting  as  a  transition  period  for 
inflation targeting, during which the communication, transparency and institutional 
setup  would  be  enhanced  gradually.  CBT’s  transition  process  to  full-fledged 
inflation  targeting  focused  on  three  issues.  First,  technical  infrastructure  was 
improved. Internal projects concentrated on the “new” inflation dynamics and the 
monetary  transmission  mechanism.  Contemporary  techniques  were  adapted  to 
enhance  the  forecasting  and  policy  analysis  framework.  Second,  communication 
skills  were  enhanced  over  time.  The  CBT  started  to  publish  more  explicit 
statements regarding its view on the inflation outlook. Qualitative forecasts were 
made  available  through  periodical  reports.  As  time  went  by,  more  and  more 
information  was  shared  with  the  public  and  the  ability  of  CBT  to  act  as  an 
“expectations manager” has improved considerably. Third, and most importantly, 
the decision-making process shifted to a more predictable and systematic setup in 
2005 by announcing fixed dates for the monetary policy committee meetings. 
5. The Outcome 
The program set out in 2002 envisaged a rather fast pace of disinflation. The plan 
was to reduce inflation to 35% in 2002, 20% in 2003, 12% in 2004 and 8% in 2005, 
all formulated as December-December changes in the consumer price index. Since 
the aim was to bring inflation down from historically high levels, CBT interpreted 
these numbers as “upper bounds” rather than point targets. 
Probably the turning point in the disinflation process was the recognition of the 
role of fiscal discipline in managing expectations under heavy fiscal dominance.
7 In 
its  various  press  releases,  the  CBT  explicitly  stated  the  importance  of  fiscal 
                                                 
7 See Celasun et al. (2002) for the evidence on role of fiscal variables such as primary budget surplus or 
debt burden in forming inflation expectations in Turkey.   
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discipline in containing expectations, stabilizing the economy and maintaining low 
inflation. The fact that the CBT and the Government jointly set the targets created a 
natural coordination between the fiscal and monetary policy. As a consequence, in 
the post-2001 period, fiscal discipline emerged as the main policy anchor along 
with central bank credibility. Coupled with the independence decreed by the CBT 
Law, this surely helped to build a reasonable amount of disinflation credibility in a 
very  short  period.  The  CBT  and  Government’s  successful  track  record  and 
commitment to achieve targets have boosted the confidence, and contributed to the 
rapid build-up of credibility.  
The outcome was surprisingly successful, outpacing all expectations. During the 
period of implicit inflation targeting, inflation came down from 68% at the end of 
2001 to 7.7 percent at the end of 2005. The policy credibility gap—gauged by the 
deviation of inflation expectations from the point target—came down significantly 
(Figure 6). What is more, growth volatility has declined and the Turkish economy 
witnessed strikingly high growth rates four years in a row.  
In the meanwhile, volatility in exchange rates and financial markets declined and 
risk premium came down. As a consequence, both the nominal and the real interest 
rates went down to historically low levels (Figure 6). 
Price setting behavior also changed during the implicit IT period: Indexation to 










                                                 
8 Kara et al. (2005) find that exchange rate pass-through in non-tradable goods was almost immediate 
and very high in the pre-2001 period, whereas the pass-through in this group came down to almost zero 
in the post 2001 period. The authors attribute this finding as an evidence of indexation to exchange rates 
before 2001 (the managed exchange rate period).   
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Figure 7. Exchange Rate Pass-Through to CPI 
Source: Kara et. al. (2005). 
6. Adoption of Full-Fledged Inflation Targeting 
All  these  developments  paved  the  way  for  the  adoption  of  formal  inflation 
targeting.  Finally,  at  the  end  of  2004,  the  CBT  announced  that  (full-fledged) 
inflation targeting would be implemented at the beginning of 2006. Announcing the 
adoption date one year in advance allowed the CBT to make the final preparations 
for  a  smooth  implementation  of  IT.  The  CBT  formulated a detailed operational 
framework for the inflation targeting regime and shared it with the public at the end 
of 2005. The main innovations in the full-fledged regime can be listed as follows: 
(i)  Decisions  were  to  be  made  on  a  voting  basis in which the Monetary Policy 
Committee  assumed  the  whole  responsibility  on  setting  the  interest  rates;  (ii)  A 
multi-year  target  horizon  was  set  and  medium  term  inflation  forecasts  were 
published in the new “Inflation Report”; (iii) The CBT committed to be accountable 
in case of sizeable deviations from the target.  
The  new  framework  presented  a  three-year  target  horizon  along  with 
“uncertainty  bands”.  Should  the  inflation  fall  outside  the  band,  CBT  would  be 
expected to prepare a separate report explaining the reasons and the likely policy 
responses to the public. The CBT stressed that the uncertainty band is not a range of 
indifference, and that midpoint of the uncertainty band should be perceived as the 
“point  target”.  The  CBT  also  emphasized  that  monetary  policy  would  pursue  a 
more  “medium  term”  oriented  approach  in  which  transitory  shocks  would  be  
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tolerated even if they jeopardize the attainability of targets in the short term. This 
move was interpreted as a shift towards a more flexible form of inflation targeting 
relative to the policy pursued in the period of 2002-2004, during when the CBT was 
fighting hard to build the disinflation credibility. 
7. Lessons for the Newcomers 
Many countries are considering to join the club of inflation targeters in the next 
couple of years. These countries are typically developing or transition economies, 
facing similar problems as Turkey did a couple of years ago. In that sense, Turkey’s 
successful experience with a smooth transition to inflation targeting over the past 
four years may be used to derive certain prescriptions for the newcomers. 
Recent research on inflation targeting tends to conclude that initial conditions do 
not matter significantly for the success of the regime.
9 Indeed, we have documented 
in this study that, despite adverse initial conditions at the beginning of the implicit 
inflation  targeting  regime,  the  final  outcome  turned  out  to  be  stunning.  Does 
Turkey’s achievement in bringing inflation down significantly in just a couple of 
years—and enjoying high growth rates at the same period—mean preconditions are 
irrelevant for the success of inflation targeting? Not necessarily. It should be re-
emphasized  that  the  strategy  Turkey  had  adopted  in  2002-2005  cannot  be 
categorized as a typical inflation targeting regime since many of the main elements 
of  inflation  targeting  were  missing.  It  was  exactly  the  lack  of  certain  set  of 
preconditions that led CBT to start with the “implicit” version of inflation targeting. 
It may be true that the sooner a country adopts inflation targeting, the sooner it 
will learn how to cope with the challenges. However, the Turkish experience shows 
that inflation targeting in itself is not a cure-all and it may be wise not to rush full-
fledged  inflation  targeting.  Turkish  experience  suggests  that,  for  countries  with 
insufficient  institutional  development  and  limited  operational  capacity  (due  to 
factors  such  as  fiscal  dominance, immature financial markets, etc.), it may be a 
good idea to start with an intermediate regime. This intermediate regime should 
have some of the basic ingredients of inflation targeting but it should not go too far; 
i.e., central bank should stress that the responsibility of controlling inflation cannot 
be  the  job  of  a  single  institution  and  that  it  requires  a  coordination  of 
macroeconomic policies as a whole. The strategy of emphasizing the role of the 
fiscal policy and structural reforms, sharing the responsibility of inflation with the 
                                                 
9 See for example Batini and Laxton (2005).  
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government, and waiting for the fiscal sustainability indicators to reach a reasonable 
threshold may be a viable option, especially when the economy is operating under 
high fiscal dominance. 
Starting with a “lighter” version, namely implicit inflation targeting, does not 
necessarily mean that the system would be exempt from all the prerequisites. Even 
at this stage, a certain set of conditions might be critical for initiating the process. 
The Turkish experience suggests that, fiscal and political commitments are at the 
top  of  the  list.  Having  the  government  to  share  the  responsibility  of  attaining 
inflation targets may help in this respect, since this will mean that the authorities 
that  bear  the  responsibility  of  targets  as  a  whole  are  able  to  deliver  their 
commitments; in other words, the authorities have the “credibility of ability”.
10 
Backing  the  intermediate  monetary  regime  with  an  appropriate  fiscal  policy 
framework  would  not  be  enough,  however.  A  high  degree  of  central  bank 
independence and a clear mandate on price stability could also be essential, for this 
would ensure that the authorities are credible on their “intentions”. Indeed, Turkish 
experience suggests that a well-structured central bank law ensuring institutional 
and instrument independence is the key to successful implementation of inflation 
targeting.  
Securing the “credibility of ability” and “credibility of intention” to attain the 
targets, may be sufficient to control near term expectations. However, in order to 
anchor  long  term  expectations,  the  transition  process  has  to  be  supported  by 
structural reforms that would ensure the sustainability of the overall framework. In 
addition, a firm degree of commitment to the floating exchange rate regime may be 
necessary,  since  this  would  rule  out  the  possibility  of  giving  mixed  signals 
regarding the main objectives of the central bank. 
This set of conditions would ensure that the pre-announced inflation targets serve 
as anchors, even if the central bank may lack a conventional monetary transmission 
channel to control inflation. Therefore, satisfying these conditions will allow the 
                                                 
10 CBT Law was often criticized by the EU officials for not having goal independence, as it commanded 
inflation  targets  to  be  set  jointly  with  the  Government.  Nonetheless,  during  four  years  of  implicit 
inflation  targeting,  this  turned  out  to  be  an  advantage  rather  than  a  culprit:  Joint  determination  of 
inflation targets allowed the Government to share the responsibility of attainment of inflation targets and 
thus increased the support for the monetary policy regime. The Government in turn committed to fiscal 
discipline, securing high primary budget surpluses and setting incomes policy in line with the targets 
four years in a row. These policies, in turn, eased the fiscal burden, contained inflation expectations, 
reduced long-term real interest rates, and enhanced growth and investments. Accordingly, Turkey has 
witnessed a disinflation period during which output grew by an average of 7 percent per annum.  
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policy makers to have a reasonable degree of leverage over expectations—sine qua 
non for targeting inflation. In that sense, Turkish experience suggests that political 
support,  institutional  independence,  and  commitment to a floating exchange rate 
regime could be listed among the fundamental conditions for initiating an inflation 
targeting regime. 
As a last remark, it would be worth reemphasizing that no single set of solutions 
fits all. However, we believe that the Turkey’s experience with implicit inflation 
targeting constitutes a genuine case study for enhancing the understanding of the 
fundamental prerequisites of inflation targeting—a topic likely to be discussed over 
and over in the future.  
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